By George Tsibani:
An observation of local politics suggests that the principal threat to South Africa’s incomplete National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is twofold: external substitution and internal fragmentation. The substitution strategy seeks to replace the African National Congress (ANC) with emergent black political parties characterised by ideological incoherence and organisational ephemerality (ANC 2012: 7). The fragmentation strategy cultivates chaos within the ANC by privileging parochial and self-interested agendas.
This dynamic is captured by the isiXhosa proverb sizelelwe yinja endlini, loosely translated as “we have fed the dog inside the house”, denoting betrayal from within (Nyembezi 1992: 84). The proverb finds resonance across South African languages:
Afrikaans: Ons het die hond in die huis gevoer — verraad van binne.
isiZulu: Sondliwe yinja yasendlini — ukukhaphela okuphuma ngaphakathi.
Xitsonga: Hi dyisile mbyana endlwini — ku xenga ka le ndzeni.
Sesotho: Re fepile ntja ka tlung — bohlabaphio bo tswang ka hare.
Tshivenda: Ro fudza mmbwa nnduni — u fhuralelwa nga vhathu vha nga ngomu.
This echoes the caution once given by President O.R. Tambo and other leaders of the liberation movement. Certain institutionalised colonial and apartheid motive forces continue to defend Global North class interests. These include, inter alia, regionalisation, tribalism and retribalisation, which function as accelerants, with measurable impact on electoral performance and organisational cohesion projected for the 2026 local government elections, the 2027 ANC National Conference, and the 2029 national elections.
Within this context, the white upper class remains the most structurally stable formation. It expresses itself through two major political parties akin to mature democracies of the Global North: the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). These are supported by think tanks and civil formations such as AfriForum, Solidarity Movement, the FW de Klerk Foundation, and other Global North non-governmental organisations. As Bond argues, “the transition secured the economic power of the old ruling bloc while conceding political office” (Bond 2014: 34). This class reproduces its hegemony by financing ideological extremes of black fashionable political parties that lack programmatic content but serve to destabilise the national question and the Two-Stage Theory.
Global North regime agencies have noted that ANC policies, strategies and plans are grounded, nurtured and tested through protracted revolutionary processes (ANC 2012: 12). Consequently, they have capitalised on the subjective interests of certain Alliance leaders, having tested that liberation movements are often hijacked by political-preneurs. These political-preneurs exploit the weaknesses of the ANC, as revealed through state capture and the looting of public resources documented by the Zondo Commission (State Capture Commission 2022: Vol. 1, 8), and the ongoing collapse of state organs exposed by the Nkabinde and Madlanga Commissions.¹
In understanding the aforesaid political complexities, a journalist, Vuyo Mvoko’s assessment of former President Thabo Mbeki is instructive when compared to his contemporaries: Mbeki’s defining trait was his willingness to act decisively to preserve the ANC as the strategic centre of the NDR (Mvoko 2022). This highlights a core Leninist principle whereby “the preservation of the vanguard is a prerequisite to the completion of historical stages” (Lenin 1917: 397). Former President Thabo Mbeki would have acted guided by NDR and the two-stage theory rather than putting his personal interests.
Notwithstanding the above, the electoral trajectory of the ANC under successive presidents demonstrates the material consequences of internal decay. Under President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela in 1994, the ANC secured 62.65% of the national vote (Electoral Commission of South Africa 1994: 3). Under President Thabo Mbeki, this rose to 66.35% in 2004 (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2004: 2). Under President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, the vote declined to 62.15% in 2014, amid the emergence of state capture and large-scale looting of public resources (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2014: 4; State Capture Commission 2022: Vol. 3, 11). Under President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa, the ANC declined further to 57.50% in 2019 and to 40.20% in May 2024 (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2024: 1). The curve from 2004 to 2024 represents a loss of 26.15 percentage points, coinciding with the institutionalisation of corruption, factionalism, and the rise of populist splinter parties deployed for regime change.
To permit the dissolution of the ANC is to arrest the NDR at the stage of national democratic tasks. As historical materialism teaches, “societies that fail to traverse required stages remain stunted, dependent, and vulnerable to recolonisation” (Lenin 1917: 414).
References
African National Congress (ANC). 2012. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC. 53rd National Conference, Mangaung.
Bond, P. 2014. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. London: Pluto Press.
Electoral Commission of South Africa. 1994. National and Provincial Elections 1994: National Results. Pretoria: IEC.
Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2004. National and Provincial Elections 2004: National Results. Pretoria: IEC.
Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2014. National and Provincial Elections 2014: National Results. Pretoria: IEC.
Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2024. National and Provincial Elections 2024: National Results. Pretoria: IEC.
Lenin, V.I. 1917. The State and Revolution. In Collected Works, Vol. 25. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Mvoko, V. 2022. ‘Mbeki and the ANC’s Survival Instinct’, Daily Maverick, 15 June. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za, accessed 28 April 2026.
Nyembezi, C.L.S. 1992. Zulu Proverbs. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter.
State Capture Commission. 2022. Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture: Report. Pretoria: The Presidency.
¹ The Nkabinde Commission (2023) and Madlanga Commission (2025) refer to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture in Provincial Organs and the Commission on the Collapse of Local Government, respectively. Full citations to be finalised upon publication of reports.
Fumene George Tsibani is Professor of Practice at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and a Water Management Expert – @NewsSA_Online
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